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Summary
This article highlights the speciﬁcity of the recruitment of senior diplomats (Advisers) in France since 
1970. The idiosyncratic character of the French situation resides in the lack of a single examination. The 
diversity of ways by which a senior diplomat can enter the French Ministry of Foreign and European 
Aﬀairs (FMFEA) leads to the coexistence within the ministry of two main groups — the ENA diplomats 
(that is, from the National School of Administration, the Ecole Nationale d’Administration) and the so-
called ‘Orient’ diplomats — each defending speciﬁc interests and roles within the French Quai d’Orsay. 
The kind of entrance exam that you take still determines careers in the French MFA. The pillarization of 
the career has nevertheless decreased since the 1990s, because the necessity to cope with common external 
challenges (such as budgetary cuts) has reinforced a shared identity among French senior diplomats. 
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the evolution of diplomatic services has given 
birth to an important corpus of literature in the domain of social sciences.1 Many 
studies focus on the impact of globalization on the diﬀerent functions that are 
* The authors would like to thank the journal’s editors and two anonymous referees for their useful 
comments.
1) S. Riordan, ‘Reforming Foreign Services for the Twenty-ﬁrst Century’, The Hague Journal of Diplo-
macy, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, pp. 161-173; Daryl Copeland, Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International 
Relations (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009); and Geoﬀrey Allen Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy 
(London: Polity, 2010).
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accomplished by senior diplomats.2 A major eﬀect of globalization on national 
diplomacy has been to make civil society just as important as states’ governments 
in shaping external policies and international relations. In consequence, a rich 
discussion has arisen on the new forms of public diplomacy as well as on the role 
of cultural diplomacy on foreign ministries’ inﬂuence across the world.
In France since the 1980s, there has been only a little scientiﬁc work on the 
evolution of the national diplomatic services. This situation can seem strange if 
we consider that France has had, since the Middle Ages, a long tradition of ana-
lytical writings on diplomacy. In the ﬁfteenth century, Philippe de Commynes, a 
nobleman from Flanders, wrote his memoirs on the missions to Italy that he 
undertook for successive kings of France.3 It is also a Frenchman, François de 
Callières, who at the beginning of the eighteenth century published one of the 
ﬁrst treatises on how to negotiate with the sovereigns of Europe.4 In the twentieth 
century, there was also a French tradition of writer — diplomats, such as Jules 
Cambon,5 who gave relevant views on the art of diplomacy. In the contemporary 
period, however, the theory of international relations remains weak as an aca-
demic discipline and this relative absence is matched to a broader decline of 
research on foreign policy in political science.6 It would be false, however, to talk 
about a complete academic black hole. During the last decade, several works have 
been written on foreign policy’s decision processes as well as on the articulation 
between national diplomacies and the external action of the European Union,7 
the profession of diplomat,8 and more generally on the work of diplomats seen 
through the angle of the sociology of work.9 In this sense, the study published by 
Loriol and others on labour conditions within the French Ministry of Foreign 
and European Aﬀairs (FMFEA) is a precious source of analysis. While it is true 
that the study was ordered by the FMFEA itself to increase knowledge on its own 
organization and functioning, the team of scholars was able to conduct investiga-
tions independently and released an unbiased document. 
2) J.W. Moses and T. Knutsen, ‘Inside out: Globalization and the Reorganization of Foreign Aﬀairs 
Ministries’, Cooperation and Conﬂict, vol. 36, no. 4, 2001, pp. 355-380.
3) Philippes de Commynes, ‘Mémoires’, Historiens et Chroniqueurs du Moyen Age (Paris: Gallimard —
La Pléaide, 1972).
4) François de Callières, The Art of Diplomacy (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1994).
5) Jules Cambon, Le Diplomate (Paris: Hachette, 1926).
6) Matthieu Chillaud, ‘International Relations in France: The “Usual Suspects” in a French Scientiﬁc 
Field of Study’, European Political Science, no. 8, 2009, pp. 239-253.
7) Frédéric Charillon (ed.), Politique étrangère: nouveaux regards (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2002); see 
also the work of the historian Maurice Vaïsse, La puissance ou l’inﬂuence? La France dans le monde depuis 
1958 (Paris: Fayard, 2009).
8) Meredith Kingston de Leusse, Diplomatie: Une sociologie des ambassadeurs (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997); 
and Samy Cohen (ed.), Les diplomates: Négocier dans un monde chaotique (Paris: Autrement, 2002).
9) M. Loriol, F. Piotet, V. Porteret and V. Boussard, Recherche en sociologie du travail sur les métiers diplo-
matiques: Rapport d’étape (Paris: Laboratoire George Friedmann CNRS/Paris I, 2007).
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Nonetheless, it is above all pamphlets and journalistic investigations, or even 
comic books on the Quai d’Orsay,10 that have been proliﬁc since the early years of 
the 2000s.11 Through these works, it is often a caricatural picture of an arrogant 
diplomacy that is painted, completely subjected to the French President’s orders, 
and spending more than it can aﬀord while living in a closed-in community. For 
this reason, a thorough sociological analysis of the Quai d’Orsay, of its personnel, 
of its practices and of its representations in the twenty-ﬁrst century is still to 
be written. 
This article only deals with one aspect of the sociology of the FMFEA. The 
study focuses on the careers of senior French diplomats working for the Quai 
d’Orsay during the period 1970-2009. Two groups of diplomats, competing for 
the top jobs at the highest ranks in the FMFEA, will particularly hold our atten-
tion. The ﬁrst group is made up of senior civil servants coming from the presti-
gious National School of Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) 
in French). People from this group enter the Quai d’Orsay after two years of study 
at the ENA with the rank of Foreign Aﬀairs’ General Adviser. In the second 
group, diplomats have been directly recruited to the FMFEA through a speciﬁc 
and highly competitive examination to become Foreign Aﬀairs Orient’s Adviser. 
The name of Orient’s Adviser comes from their complete mastery of at least one 
speciﬁc language (such as Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic, Farsi, but also German or 
Dutch). This duality inside the FMFEA allows a characteristic to be highlighted 
that is shared by a larger part of the French public administration — France’s 
bureaucratic corps, as described by several analysts during the 1980s,12 is a place 
where the domination of one’s status does not guarantee exactly the same career 
track to people who are supposed to do the same work globally. 
The study is based ﬁrst on data collected in the Annuaire Diplomatique et Con-
sulaire, completed with interviews conducted among French diplomats during 
spring 2011. The Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire is a document that has no 
equivalent in any other French ministry. Published every year by the Quai d’Orsay, 
this 2,000-page book includes detailed organizational charts of every department 
within the FMFEA and of every diplomatic or consular mission abroad. This 
book also provides a detailed biographic note for every staﬀ member at the 
FMFEA, ranked in alphabetical order and ranging from staﬀ recruited directly 
after a high school degree to those who entered the Quai d’Orsay after ﬁve or 
more years of higher education. Through the nominal lists of agents by rank, it is 
possible to follow the evolution of the career of every one of them, and even, by 
applying a salary scale that is shared by all French administrations, to calculate 
10) The designation of the Quai d’Orsay refers to its geographical location in Paris.
11) Franck Renaud, Les diplomates: Derrière les façades des ambassades de France (Paris: Nouveaux Mondes, 
2010); Christophe Blain and Abel Lanzac, Quai d’Orsay: Chroniques Diplomatiques (Paris: Dargaud, 
2010).
12) Marie-Christine Kessler, Les grands corps de l’Etat (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1986).
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their salaries when they are employed at the central administration — which 
means when they do not get expatriation allowances. The suﬃciency and trans-
parency of the Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire contradicts the culture of 
secrecy that is usually attributed to the FMFEA. For scholars, it provides a reliable 
source of information. 
The study focuses on the careers of senior French diplomats who were recruited 
between 1970 and 2004 and who have reached at least the position of Adviser 
(Conseiller in French), and who have been appointed to this rank directly. This 
choice should not obscure the fact that one-third of foreign aﬀairs’ advisers 
obtained this position through internal promotion, which means that they started 
their career at a lower level and entered the FMFEA through the Foreign Aﬀairs 
Secretary examination, for example. However, this article is not to be regarded as 
a quantitative study developed through an extensive use of statistical methods. 
Rather, it is a qualitative study, which uses speciﬁc examples of several individuals’ 
careers to draw general lessons. The choice to focus on eleven years, spread over a 
34-year period, stems from this limited ambition. The choice of the years 1970, 
1971, 1972, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 allows us to 
compile a large sample that is representative of the diﬀerent age groups working 
in the Quai d’Orsay and of the wide range of hierarchical positions within it. The 
senior executives recruited in 1970 are, in 2009, often already retired or approach-
ing the end of their careers. On the opposite end of the scale, Advisers recruited 
in 2004 are still in the ﬁrst years of their career. Through these eleven years, the 
study examines the cases of 107 French senior diplomats from the FMFEA, 57 
from the ENA and 50 from the Orient’s Adviser examination. The article assumes 
that this study is enough to draw some generalizations on French senior diplo-
mats’ careers. 
Although the article tries to identify what could be seen as the ideal career path 
of French senior diplomats, we are conscious that a term such as ‘classical career’ 
should be used only with restraint. One career can never be exactly identical to 
another. Being a senior diplomat involves having a diverse, original and unique 
livelihood. Individuals create their own careers according to the studies that they 
have undertaken, the regions that they like, and a multiplicity of other factors, 
such as reputation, political relations, social network, marital situation and pri-
vate tastes.
The article starts by assessing the career of senior diplomats who were recruited 
from the ENA as General Aﬀairs’ Advisers. The same exercise is then undertaken 
for the senior diplomats who were recruited as Orient’s Advisers. Third, the article 
explains the reasons for the decreasing pillarization of roles and attitudes between 
the ENA and the Orient’s Advisers inside the FMFEA. Finally, the article 
concludes by stressing which research agendas on French diplomacy could be 
followed. 
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Access through the National School of Administration (ENA): Still the 
Royal Way 
Generations of French senior civil servants have been educated at the ENA since 
its creation in 1945.13 The fact that many graduates from the ENA joined the 
ranks of the main French political parties of the Fifth Republic and served further 
in various governments (both left and right wing) has increased the prestige of the 
school. It is an original characteristic of the Fifth Republic to have recruited many 
of its main political leaders among its government oﬃcials. This led the political 
scientist Jean-Louis Quermonne to talk about a ‘heavy presence of bureaucrats in 
the political sphere’ (in French, ‘une fonctionnarisation de la politique’) since 
1958.14 
Nonetheless, this tendency to recruit politicians among high-ranking civil ser-
vants has faded since the 1990s. Coupled with the diminishing inﬂuence of the 
state in a world of ﬁerce capitalism and open markets, this trend was certainly 
damaging for the ENA’s standing. However, being accepted to the ENA remains 
a very diﬃcult challenge. The school’s selectivity is one of the highest in France 
and the number of posts has been decreasing since the end of the 1990s as a con-
sequence of budgetary restrictions within the public service. In 2010, only 80 
people were chosen to follow the two-year programme in Strasbourg, punctuated 
by regular in-the-ﬁeld internships. 
One can enter the ENA through three diﬀerent examinations, all similarly 
selective and competitive. The ‘outside’ examination, through which 40 people 
were selected in 2010, is open to university graduates who have undertaken at 
least three years of study (BA degree). In reality, this group is often constituted of 
graduates from Sciences Po in Paris who have already done at least ﬁve years of 
study, often six and sometimes even more. The ‘inside’ examination, by which 
32 people were accepted in 2010, is designed for civil servants of the state, of ter-
ritorial authorities, of public establishments, and of international governmental 
organizations who have had four complete years of service. This is thus an exam 
that is aimed generally at older candidates who want to secure better promotion 
in their career. The third and ﬁnal examination, through which came the last 
eight selected candidates of 2010, is more original. It is aimed at agents from the 
private sector, elected oﬃcials (municipal advisers or mayors, for example) and 
leaders of non-governmental bodies (such as unions) who want to reorient their 
career to work in the public service, after having completed at least eight years in 
those diverse sectors. 
13) Jean-François Kesler, Le pire des systèmes . . . à l’exception de tous les autres: de l’énarchie, de la noblesse 
d’Etat et de la reproduction sociale (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995).
14) Jean-Louis Quermonne, L’appareil administratif de l’Etat (Paris: Le Seuil, 1991).
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The main aspect of the education provided at the ENA is found in its multi-
disciplinary nature. The school aims to educate generalists who should have cer-
tain mobility in the public service, and not single-subject specialists. In accordance 
with this logic, the position that the ENA graduates will gain in a French minis-
try, when they ﬁnish their two years of study, depends primarily on their ranking 
compared to their fellow students. The career choices made by the ENA students 
are then determined by the marks that they received while in the school (from 
exams and training). The top graduates on the exit-ranking list will traditionally 
choose to serve in one of the Grand corps de l’Etat, which are also the most inter-
esting, in terms of prestige and salary, such as the State’s Council (Conseil d’Etat), 
the Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes) or the Treasury’s General Inspectorate 
(Inspection générale des Finances). The second-ranking students on the list will 
usually choose to work in the FMFEA, where they are recruited directly as For-
eign Aﬀairs’ General Advisers. There is no speciﬁc training scheme for the future 
diplomats inside the ENA. Once recruited by the Quai d’Orsay, they will follow 
an obligatory four months of training, just like all senior staﬀ, at the Diplomatic 
and Consular Institute of the FMFEA. This is a recent development, as this school 
was created by, and for, the FMFEA in April 2010. Finally, the remaining gradu-
ates from the ENA (that is, a majority of them) will hold positions in diﬀerent 
ministries — with a preference for the Ministry of Economics and Finance — or 
in administrative tribunals. 
In 2010, three ENA graduates joined the FMFEA as Foreign Aﬀairs’ General 
Advisers. There were four to do so in 2009, as well as four in 2008, and seven in 
2007 and 2006. The choice of the FMFEA within the ENA depends, of course, 
on the interest that the graduating students show in an international career, but 
also, as observed above, on their placement in the ultimate ranking. In conse-
quence, some of the ENA graduates choose to follow a career in the Quai d’Orsay 
simply because their personal ranking did not grant them access to the Grands 
corps de l’Etat, which are highly selective in terms of the positions available. In 
2010, only four positions were oﬀered at the State’s Council, four others at the 
Court of Auditors, and four as well at the Treasury’s General Inspectorate. Never-
theless, over-generalization should be avoided. It also happens that some of the 
ENA students choose the Quai d’Orsay rather than a Grand corps simply because 
they want to work in the ﬁeld of international relations. 
It has already been noted that a vast majority of the FMFEA’s diplomats gradu-
ating from the ENA studied previously at Sciences Po in Paris, another prestigious 
school of social sciences, which was created in 1873 outside of the French univer-
sity system and recruits its students through selective exams. Other ENA diplo-
mats generally have a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in law and a more diverse 
career in the French administration if they entered the ENA through the ‘inside’ 
examination. They can also have done the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS), 
another grande école, which normally prepares students for the career of high 
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school teacher and then university lecturer. If ENS candidates are studying at the 
ENA, it is to escape the job of teacher, because the salary and social prestige of 
such jobs have diminished greatly within French society. 
The article’s sample allows ﬁve trends about the career of the ENA graduates 
inside the Quai d’Orsay to be stressed. First, the ENA graduates are more inclined 
to follow a multilateral path than the Orient’s Advisers, with multilateral here 
meaning a diplomatic career that is mostly devoted to intergovernmental organi-
zations (IOs). In the study’s sample, 79 per cent of the diplomats graduating from 
the ENA held a position at the French Permanent Representation to the United 
Nations (in New York or in Geneva), or at the French Permanent Representations 
to the European Union (EU), to the North Atlantic Council, to the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They often obtain such 
positions relatively early in their career, after six years as Secretaries and after ten 
years as Advisers. Eventually, after twenty years of service, they frequently become 
appointed as Ambassadors in these posts. For example, all of the successive French 
Ambassadors to the Permanent Representation to the European Union since 
1977 graduated from the ENA. This trend can also be observed in the appoint-
ments at the central administration, where the ENA graduates are more often 
placed in multilateral departments than in geographical ones. For instance, the 
Director for European Cooperation was appointed in 1997, twenty years after 
graduating from the ENA; he was in 2011 the Secretary-General of the FMFEA. 
The Director for Scientiﬁc and Technical Cooperation was appointed in 1993, 
sixteen years after leaving the ENA; in 2011 he was one of the Diplomatic Advis-
ers of the French government. The Assistant Director for Disarmament was 
appointed in 2006, ten years after graduating from the ENA; in 2011 he was 
heading the French Permanent Representation to NATO. Inside the multilateral 
path, diplomats from the ENA develop their career around a speciﬁc expertise. 
EU aﬀairs and disarmament/security aﬀairs constitute two areas of specialization 
in which people could make their whole career.
The ENA graduates, when they occupy and eﬀectively trust bilateral positions, 
are posted to ‘big’ developed countries (such as the United States, EU capitals, 
Russia, Canada, Australia and Japan), or in the major emerging countries (such 
as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa or Egypt). 58 per cent have occu-
pied a post at the French Embassy in London or in Washington at least once 
during their ﬁrst ﬁfteen years of service. Consequently, they often become Ambas-
sador in the aforementioned countries after 20 to 30 years of career. For instance, 
the French Ambassador to Canada in 2004 got his position 34 years after gradu-
ating from the ENA. In 2008, the French Ambassador to Tokyo got his job 32 
years after graduating from the ENA. The French Ambassador to Beijing in 1996, 
preceded by Moscow in 1992, got his positions 25 and 21 years, respectively, after 
graduating from the ENA. 
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The ENA graduates are more inclined to take on jobs as political advisers com-
pared to other diplomats, not only at the service of the French Minister of For-
eign Aﬀairs or European Aﬀairs, but also as Adviser to the President of the 
Republic or to the Prime Minister. According to Marc Loriol’s sociological study 
of the FMFEA, diplomats who graduated from both the ENA and Sciences Po 
occupied on average 1.5 positions in a political function, whereas this number 
was only 1.1 on average for those who only did the ENA, and 0.7 for the Orient’s 
Advisers.15 After having held positions in a ‘cabinet’ (which means a minister’s 
private oﬃce in France), they continue their diplomatic career, which is acceler-
ated by this spell, thanks to the new contacts that they have established within the 
political sphere. As an example, diplomats who graduated from the ENA in 1992 
constitute an enlightening case of the advantage of making a detour towards a 
political function. Among the six, three have attained the highest position, called 
‘Out of Rank Adviser’ (Conseiller des aﬀaires étrangères hors classe). The interesting 
point is that these three people have all held political functions inside and outside 
the FMFEA: one was Diplomatic Adviser to the French Prime Minister from 
1997 to 2002; the second was Adviser to the Deputy Minister on European 
Aﬀairs in the late 1990s; and the third was Adviser to the French Foreign Minister 
in 2007. Since 2009, they have been appointed, respectively, as French Ambas-
sador to the UN and to the IOs in Vienna, Head of the service in charge of the 
EU Common and Foreign Security Policy, and French Ambassador in Tel Aviv. 
Quite signiﬁcantly, their three colleagues who simply followed the regular diplo-
matic career are ‘only’ Second Adviser in New Delhi, Second Adviser to the UN, 
and Deputy Director for Scientiﬁc and Academic Cooperation. It is among the 
group of ENA graduates that we also ﬁnd diplomats who have moved to a politi-
cal career as members of the government or members of the French Parliament. 
In this sample, two have become members of the French National Assembly or of 
the European Parliament: Dominique Souchet (ENA, 1972); and Sylvie Goulard 
(ENA, 1989). 
Fourth, the ENA graduates despise consular activities. Having studied politics 
and public aﬀairs, they are more interested in political chancellery and consider 
the work of consular agents to be less rewarding. When they do take a consular 
post, it is to access immediately the rank of General Consul in a prestigious city 
such as Quebec, Sao Paulo, New York, San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, Hong Kong 
or Miami. This consular experience occurs relatively early in their career, after 
twelve years of service, and extremely rarely after more than twenty years spent in 
the FMFEA.
Finally, the ENA graduates are quicker to reach the rank of Minister Plenipo-
tentiary, which is the most important step in terms of salary, but also to get a 
15) Marc Loriol, ‘La carrière des diplomates français: entre parcours individuel et structuration collective’, 
Sociologies, 2009, available online at http://sociologies.revues.org/index2936.html.
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position as Ambassador, even if it is not a compulsory prerequisite. According to 
our sample, the ENA graduates reached this rank after an average of 19.5 years of 
career (with a minimum of 17 years and a maximum of 22 years), while Orient’s 
Advisers needed an average of 22.5 years (with a minimum of 18 years and a 
maximum of 29 years).16 
There is no doubt that ‘Enarques’ (as ENA graduates are known) tended in the 
period 1970-2009 to access higher positions in more prestigious embassies and 
that they did so quicker and more easily than others. For the last 40 years, the 
ENA has been the royal way to have a successful career as a diplomat in France. 
The Orient’s Advisers: First Row, Second Rate
The mere name of the ‘Orient entrance examination’ is a legacy of France’s colo-
nial experience, a period when national diplomacy recruited senior executives to 
serve in non-Western countries that were often considered as part of a far and 
mysterious East. The term ‘Orient’ was used in a similar way in the research ﬁeld 
of oriental civilization. To talk about ‘orientalism’ was not then such a polemic 
subject as it is today. The National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civiliza-
tions (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, INALCO) is a 
reminder of this French orientalism, just as the famous London-based School of 
African and Oriental Studies (SOAS) reminds us of the United Kingdom’s colo-
nial past.17 The name ‘Orient examination’ was thus retained at the FMFEA; it 
allows for the direct recruitment of a small number of executives who study in 
depth, and eﬀectively master, at least one oriental language. In 2011 there were 
three distinct groups of languages that are recognized at the entrance examina-
tion. The ﬁrst group is dedicated to Central and Eastern Europe. Oddly, German 
and Dutch were recognized at the end of the 1990s as oriental languages, thus 
putting the adjective into perspective, although in March 2011 there were discus-
sions inside the FMFEA — under pressure from non-Europeanists inside the 
Orient’s corps — to delete this policy and to give more credit to rare languages 
such as Hindi, Chinese or Swahili.18 The second group includes Southern Asia 
and the Far East; and the third group focuses on Eastern Mediterranean lan-
guages, the Maghreb and Africa. 
Until 1999, the recruitment of the Orient’s senior staﬀ was carried out through 
a ‘Foreign Aﬀairs’ Orient Secretary Examination’. The situation changed in 1999 
when a ‘Foreign Aﬀairs’ Orient Adviser Examination’ was created as a direct rival 
16) In the particular status of the agents of the FMFEA, nomination to the grade of 2nd-rank Plenipoten-
tiary Minister requires at least sixteen years of service in the ‘Out of Rank’ Advisers’ grade. 
17) Pierre Labrousse, Deux siècles d’histoire de l’Ecole des langues orientales, 1795-1995 (Paris: Hervas, 
1995).
18) Interview at the FMFEA, 16 March 2011. 
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to the post-ENA recruitment method. This very selective examination — only six 
to eight people are accepted out of hundreds every year — is also divided, as is the 
ENA’s exam, between an external examination that is reserved for young univer-
sity graduates, and an internal examination through which current employees of 
any French administration (in practice, the FMFEA) can apply. In addition to 
perfect mastery of English and of an oriental language, the test includes a general 
knowledge examination, a law or economics assessment, and questions on inter-
national and European issues. In this way, it is not so diﬀerent from other exami-
nations that allow university graduates access to the French public sector. Yet 
what can be observed from the careers of diplomats who acceded to the Quai 
d’Orsay through the Orient’s Adviser examination (or Orient’s Secretary before 
1999)?
The Orient’s Advisers have a bachelor’s or a master’s degree in law, history or a 
diploma from Sciences Po. In our sample, a majority of the agents (29 out of 50) 
came from Sciences Po. Half of them (24 out of 50) also graduated in parallel from 
INALCO. It is interesting to stress that study at INALCO was more the case for 
the older generations — those who studied during the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s — than for the newer generation who could have studied languages in 
other universities. Orient’s Advisers can thus be considered as the most vocational 
diplomats. For several years they studied a speciﬁc language and culture, they 
often lived in foreign countries, and joined the ministry to go and work in coun-
tries that they like. With regard to the social background of French diplomats, it 
is not at all proven that ENA graduates have higher social origins than Orient’s 
Advisers — contrary to what is argued in the Quai d’Orsay’s Department of 
Human Resources.19 For example, 12 per cent of former ENA students possess a 
name belonging to the French aristocracy, but 10 per cent of Orient’s Advisers in 
our sample do too. The diﬀerence is thus small. The careers of the Orient’s Advis-
ers still start, however, at a slightly inferior rank compared to their ENA col-
leagues. They are ﬁrst appointed abroad as a Third or Second Secretary, contrary 
to the ‘Enarques’ who usually become directly First Secretaries, because the two 
years spent at the ENA count for seniority. Moreover, their escalation up the 
diplomatic ladder is somehow less rapid. On average, they become Assistant Sec-
retary (Sous Directeur) after ﬁfteen years in the ministry, Deputy Director after 
twenty years, and eventually Director when they are about to celebrate their thir-
tieth year of diplomatic service. For example, one Orient’s Adviser was appointed 
as Assistant Director to the Staﬀ Department fourteen years after his entrance in 
the FMFEA, and Director for Asia and Oceania in 2000, 30 years after having 
passed the examination. In 2009, the Director for Development Aid previously 
held the post of Assistant Director to the Middle East and Deputy Director for 
North Africa and the Middle East in Paris, respectively fourteen and 23 years 
19) Interview at the FMFEA, 23 March 2011.
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after having been recruited. The position of Ambassador is rarely obtained before 
having spent twenty years working for the FMFEA. 
Senior Orient’s Advisers are appointed more to small and middle-sized coun-
tries and then gain more responsibilities as their careers are about to end. There 
are some exceptions to this general trend. Jean-David Levitte, for instance, was 
recruited through the Orient examination and not the ENA. He was appointed 
Director for Asia and Oceania after twenty years, and then Ambassador to the 
UN Security Council, to the United States, before joining the Presidency of the 
Republic as Diplomatic Adviser to the President. Maurice Gourdault-Montagne 
is another exception of an Orient Adviser who had a fast-track career inside the 
ministry. Recruited through the Orient examination in 1978, he became French 
Ambassador to Tokyo in 1998, then to London in 2002, and ﬁnally to Berlin 
in 2011. 
Another general trend is that only 20 per cent of Orient’s Advisers follow a 
multilateral path inside the FMFEA and work in the French permanent represen-
tations to the major international organizations. Again, a limited number of 
exceptions exist. Ambassador Jean-David Levitte spent a long part of his career 
appointed to the French representations to the UN, both in New York and 
Geneva. 
Orient’s Advisers are usually mobile diplomats. They spend more years posted 
to foreign embassies and consulates than their colleagues graduating from the 
ENA. Their mobility can be explained by the fact that serving abroad is a voca-
tion for the Orient’s Advisers. When they are at the central administration, Ori-
ent’s Advisers tend to take jobs in the geographical directorates of the ministry. 
Nonetheless, the FMFEA is a small department compared to other French min-
istries and it is not always easy to ﬁnd a job in connection with the region of 
specialization. For example, a specialist of Eastern European languages who 
entered the Quai d’Orsay in 1972 through the Orient’s Adviser examination was 
then appointed to such diverse capitals as Stockholm, Ankara, Islamabad, Hel-
sinki, Tokyo, Athens, Skopje, Tirana, Valetta and Ulan Bator. Another Orient’s 
Adviser who was recruited in 1972, and who mastered Japanese and Korean, held 
positions in Tokyo, Manila, Hanoi, Bombay, Phnom Penh, Kinshasa, Abidjan 
and Antananarivo. The human resources’ department of the FMFEA has recently 
adopted a proactive policy of only appointing Orient’s Advisers to the region(s) 
where they are specialists. Yet experience has shown, especially in the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, that remaining in the same region throughout the entirety of a 
career could be damaging for the renewal of French foreign policy. Many diplo-
mats, in developing close and friendly relations with the leaders in power (which 
were rarely democratic), often became obstacles to any push for change or to any 
call for better governance and greater protection of human rights in the region. 
Orient’s Advisers are less prone (and eager) to obtain political appointments in 
ministerial ‘cabinets’ in Paris. Indeed, they enter the Quai d’Orsay to engage in 
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diplomacy and usually do not have the same broad political ambition that the 
ENA graduates possess. Interestingly, however, Orient’s Advisers who get a polit-
ical position as Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic or to the 
Prime Minister experience a favourable push in their career. Just to take again the 
examples of Jean-Daniel Levitte and Maurice Gourdault-Montagne: the ﬁrst was 
Diplomatic Adviser to the Presidency of the Republic from 1993-1995 and then 
again since 2007; the second was Director of the Prime Minister’s private oﬃce 
from 1995-1997 and then had six years as President Chirac’s Diplomatic Adviser 
(from 1997-1998 and from 2002-2007). Getting a position on the border of 
politics and administration remains a strong personal advantage for the few Ori-
ent’s Advisers who gain access to such posts. 
Finally, a post of Consul-General is not such an uncommon phenomenon for 
an Orient’s Adviser as for an ENA graduate. Out of the 21 diplomats in our 
sample who entered the FMFEA during the years 1970, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1978 
and 1979, eight had held such a post by 2009. They sometimes take a post of 
Assistant Consul-General or Deputy Consul-General relatively early in their 
career. A post of Consul-General can then be obtained at diverse moment of their 
careers; the appointment depends more on the importance of the city than on the 
rank of the diplomat. In consequence, if an Orient’s Adviser was able to be nom-
inated as the Consul-General in Cracow after only ten years in the FMFEA, 
another one had to wait eighteen years to hold a similar position in Johannes-
burg, and a last one 28 years to become the French Consul-General in Washing-
ton (one of the most attractive consular posts). At the end, consular activities are 
no more popular for the Orient’s Advisers than for the ENA graduates. Chancel-
lery work still remains their priority.
To sum up, Orient’s Advisers’ careers contrasted with the careers of their col-
leagues from the ENA in the period 1970-2009. Diplomats by vocation, they 
tended to hold more posts outside the central administration in Paris, they 
favoured bilateral relations and worked in geographical departments. Moreover, 
they seemed somehow to be slower to climb the diplomatic career ladder. If Ori-
ent’s Advisers are at the ﬁrst row of French diplomacy, they still may be regarded 
as second-rate diplomats when compared to the ‘Enarques’. 
Towards a Decreasing Pillarization 
Even though political scientists have focused more on France’s public policies 
rather than on its high public service since the 1990s, the French administration 
generally remains described as structured around diﬀerent and relatively com-
partmentalized corps.20 This ‘pillarization’, to use a term derived from the study 
20) Jean-Patrice Lacam, La France: une république de mandarins? Les hauts fonctionnaires et la politique 
(Bruxelles: Complexe, 2000). 
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of pluralistic political systems,21 leads to permanent negotiations among the corps 
in order to secure control of the high-ranking positions within the state’s bureau-
cracy. This phenomenon also explains the atomization of the public policy-mak-
ing processes, as policy networks are frequently built between speciﬁc bureaucratic 
corps and speciﬁc private interests. Finally, pillarization has sometimes been 
destabilized, or on the contrary strengthened, by the new transnational networks 
of actors that can emerge from EU negotiations. 
This study shows that access to the position of Foreign Aﬀairs Adviser at the 
FMFEA through several diﬀerent examinations and not through a unique exam-
ination — as is the case in Germany, the United Kingdom or Italy — led between 
1970 and 2009 to a certain diﬀerentiated defence of interests by diplomats 
depending on their aﬃliation with a certain corps, which was regarded as a pillar. 
Pillarization has an institutional translation in union representation. At the 
FMFEA there is both a Union of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents coming 
from the ENA (in French, Association syndicale des agents diplomatiques et consul-
aires issus de l’ENA — ADIENA) and a Union of the Diplomatic and Consular 
Orient Agents (in French, Association syndicale des agents diplomatiques et consul-
aires d’Orient — ASAO). To these two organizations, several others can be added 
that defend particular administrative statuses within the FMFEA and also the 
representation of the main French national unions, such as the Confédération 
Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT). In consequence, each association 
makes sure that the interests of its corps are respected within the FMFEA during 
the meetings of the so-called Joint Administrative Commissions. Such Commis-
sions are composed of an equal number of representatives from the administra-
tion and from the unions. The representatives will ultimately be those who 
propose the promotion list to the Minister of Foreign and European Aﬀairs. Pro-
motion to the rank of ‘Out of Class Adviser’ is a sensitive issue, as it is not auto-
matically given to any senior diplomat and remains a strong sign of professional 
success. Representatives from ADIENA and from ASAO will ensure that certain 
quotas of ‘their’ people are present in such lists. Through this mechanism, they 
also prove to be faithful to a classic characteristic of pillarization — namely, a 
balancing act between groups. 
The idea of an ENA pillar, which is always and systematically opposed to an 
Orient pillar, must however be put into perspective. Among the personnel of the 
Quai d’Orsay, a strong sense of identity exists that goes along with a clear rejection 
of everything that could be interpreted as an external intrusion in its internal 
aﬀairs. As a result, both corps ﬁnd themselves united against the procedure per-
mitted by the personnel’s status that allows senior public servants from other 
ministries to be nominated as Plenipotentiary Ministers. Similarly, diplomats 
21) Arend Lijphart, Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press, 1977).
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from the ENA or from the group of Orient’s Advisers strongly dislike nomina-
tions of non-government oﬃcials to the rank of Plenipotentiary Minister, as a 
reward for serving the Ministry in a speciﬁc way. One recent similar nomination 
occurred in December 2008, when the Minister of Foreign and European Aﬀairs, 
Bernard Kouchner, promoted his special adviser and spokesman to such a grade. 
A medical doctor who was previously engaged in humanitarian action thus 
became the Plenipotentiary Minister; he was appointed Ambassador to Syria in 
September 2009 and is now able to pursue a career in the diplomatic service until 
he retires. 
As we have seen above, the two ways of recruiting high-ranking diplomats (the 
ENA and Orient) between 1970 and 2009 served to occupy functions that were 
not exactly similar within the FMFEA. However, such diﬀerences became more 
and more blurred, mostly because of a series of new constraints. The ﬁrst of these 
new constraints was the general diminution of FMFEA’s budgetary resources 
since 2004. The ministry has indeed been strongly aﬀected by the regulations 
imposed by the Ministry of Budget to every public administration since that date. 
Still, the Quai d’Orsay had already started to reduce its expenditures before 2004 
and, in consequence, has seen its resources diminish 25 per cent in the last twenty 
years.22 In addition, the FMFEA’s budget that is devoted to cultural cooperation 
is being taken away (by way of experiment for the moment) by an external oper-
ator, the French Institute (in French, Institut Français). This operator’s mandate is 
to bring all of the French Institutes and French Alliances (Alliances Françaises) in 
foreign countries together, along the lines of the British Council or Goethe Institut 
models. Still, France retains the most important diplomatic network in the world, 
with 162 diplomatic posts and 235 consular posts in 2010. Nevertheless, more 
and more embassies located in small countries are composed merely of an Ambas-
sador and an Adviser. This diminution of resources also translated into a reduc-
tion in expatriation allowances for the staﬀ, which represent in France the main 
component of the salary of a diplomat who is appointed to a foreign country. 
Agents of the FMFEA, who insist that their administration only represents 1.2 or 
1.3 per cent of the French state’s yearly expenditures, experience this reduction as 
a drop in status. Incidentally, the decrease in expatriation allowances gave way in 
December 2003 to one of the ﬁrst strikes of French diplomatic agents in embas-
sies and consulates abroad. 
Another source of rapprochement between diplomats from the ENA and from 
the group of Orient’s Advisers lies in the common feeling of a gap between the 
administration of the Quai d’Orsay and the Ministers of Foreign Aﬀairs who fol-
lowed one another between 2002 and 2011. Since Hubert Védrine left the posi-
tion in 2002, his successors have had diﬃculties in being well accepted by their 
own administration. Even though he had a successful career as a diplomat behind 
22) Alain Juppé and Hubert Védrine, ‘Cessez d’aﬀaiblir le Quai d’Orsay’, Le Monde, 6 July 2010.
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him, Dominique de Villepin, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs from 2002 to 2004, 
experienced such diﬃculties, certainly because of a series of unpopular reforms 
(such as the decrease of expatriation allowances) that he passed. Another explana-
tion resides in the limited political weight of de Villepin’s followers with the Pres-
idency of the Republic and its diplomatic advisers. In the French Fifth Republic 
system, the President of the Republic is the ultimate authority to decide foreign 
and defence policies, and the political weight of the Foreign Minister is important 
in order to secure some autonomy for the diplomatic administration, which is out 
of the Elysée’s reach.23 Yet for six years, none of the French Ministers of Foreign 
Aﬀairs succeeded in distancing themselves from the President and acquiring real 
independence: Michel Barnier between 2004 and 2005, Philippe Douste-Blazy 
between 2005 and 2007, Bernard Kouchner from 2007 to 2010, and Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, who was brieﬂy nominated to this post between 2010 and 2011, 
were all eclipsed by the strength of the Presidential function.24 In this sense, the 
return to the Quai d’Orsay of Alain Juppé since February 2011 has been seen as a 
relief by most diplomats, as Alain Juppé had successfully gained the trust of the 
diplomatic administration during his ﬁrst mandate as Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs 
(between 1993 and 1995) thanks to a skilfully executed reform of the service. 
Moreover, his nomination as number two in the government of French Prime 
Minister François Fillon has been perceived as a protection from the too-system-
atic intervention of the French Presidency in diplomatic aﬀairs.25 
Finally, rather than opposing each other, several general features of the careers 
within the FMFEA move the two pillars closer to one another. Among them 
should be noted the increasing diﬃculty for a generation of senior executives 
from the baby boom generation to obtain a position as Ambassador or Director 
at the central administration for lack of vacant positions. In 2011, there were 
about 35 executives in the FMFEA who did not perform badly throughout their 
career but still cannot get hold of the position as Ambassador to which they are 
legitimately entitled.26 In the Quai d’Orsay’s language, they are designated as 
‘agents on shelves’.
A policy for managing human resources, which was intended to individualize 
the agents’ careers, was only introduced in the FMFEA towards the end of the 
1990s. Before this reform, the FMFEA restricted itself to mere bureaucratic man-
agement of careers. The main rationale behind this phenomenon was that serious 
work on human resources was relegated to the beneﬁt of the ‘noble’ task of 
23) Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire: les coulisses de la politique étrangère de la Vème République (Paris: 
Hachette, 1986).
24) The resignation of Michèle Alliot-Marie in February 2011 led to the unprecedented publication by 
various groups of anonymous diplomats of opinion pieces in the press criticizing the weakness of French 
ministers of foreign aﬀairs. 
25) Christian Lequesne, ‘Nicolas Sarkozy et la diplomatie française’, Revue des Deux Mondes, October-
November, 2011, pp. 85-94.
26) Interview at the FMFEA, 23 March 2011.
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making foreign policy. The late discovery of managerial functions was also essen-
tial for budgetary matters, under pressure from the General Revision of Public 
Policies (in French, RGPP), which was initiated by François Fillon’s conservative 
government in 2008 with the goal of reducing the general deﬁcit of the public 
budget. Indeed, this deﬁcit still represented 149 billion euros in 2009, the equiv-
alent of 8.2 per cent of France’s gross domestic product (GDP).
Even though the Foreign Aﬀairs Advisers coming from the ENA still have, in 
2011, a certain advantage in terms of career compared to the Orient’s Advisers, 
they are the ones who feel the more threatened by the evolution within the 
FMFEA. As a result, they are also the ones who express the strongest corporatist 
claims inside the FMFEA. 
A certain feeling of threat among the ENA diplomats is not only the result of 
the reduced number of positions made available at the Quai d’Orsay to the ENA 
since 2008 and thus of their total share among the Foreign Aﬀairs Advisers (only 
20 per cent in 2011). It also comes from the fact that the elitism of the ENA 
socializes young civil servants to certain ‘normal’ forms of competition in order to 
secure the ‘best’ positions. In this regard, the novelty of nominating diplomats 
from the group of Orient’s Advisers to the French Embassy in London, Berlin, 
Beijing or Moscow is perceived as an emblematic loss of power. Diplomats from 
the ENA have found it diﬃcult accepting this change, as the embassy — like the 
prefecture at the national level — still represents public service authority, where 
the senior civil servant can enjoy power as the personalized embodiment of the 
French state.
If pillarization continues to diﬀerentiate at the Quai d’Orsay between the 
careers of diplomats who graduated from the ENA and diplomats who took the 
Orient examination, this pillarization, in the most recent period, far from increas-
ing, has tended to reduce itself. Yet the fact that ENA graduates’ careers resemble 
more and more those of their colleagues from the group of Orient’s Advisers is 
certainly perceived by former students of the ENA as a loss of privilege and status. 
Conclusion
This article highlights the speciﬁcity of the recruitment of senior diplomats in 
France since 1970. The idiosyncratic character of the French situation resides in 
the lack of a single examination. The diversity of ways through which one can 
enter the FMFEA leads to the coexistence within the ministry of several pillars, 
each linked to speciﬁc procedures of recruitment. 
Another characteristic in the careers of French diplomats, which is shared this 
time with France’s working environment in general, is the importance of one’s 
conditions of access in the future development of one’s career. The way that you 
enter an institution and the schools that you graduated from are still decisive in 
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France in the constitution of your professional career. In the case of the FMFEA, 
this remark needs to be put into perspective by the fact that the internal promo-
tion of agents from lower to higher grades is more frequent than the average of 
other French ministries. As a matter of fact, if this study focuses on the means of 
direct recruitment of senior staﬀ through the most selective examinations (what 
is called ‘entrance through the main gate’, or ‘entrée par la grande porte’ in French), 
one-third of Foreign Aﬀairs Advisers were actually nominated to this grade after 
having entered the FMFEA through a lower-rank examination. 
This study also underlines how much the interaction between the administra-
tion and politics, notably through the cabinets ministériels, has an inﬂuence on the 
career of particular individuals in the French diplomatic system.
Finally, since the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the recruitment of dip-
lomats or senior diplomats has occurred in a context that is marked not only by a 
serious reduction in the budgetary resources of the FMFEA, but also by a pro-
found reconsideration of its professional practices. This article has only sketched 
this last dimension, which will absolutely have to be examined further in a sys-
tematic sociology of French diplomats’ professional practices. 
In France, as in most countries, the job of Ambassador continues to take on a 
symbolic dimension of authority, through the classical representative mission of 
Westphalian-style diplomacy. However, Ambassadors in the twenty-ﬁrst century 
should be more concerned about public diplomacy. Public diplomacy requires 
taking into account new practices, such as the capacity to host meetings and 
exchanges in an informal setting, the competence to use new information tech-
nologies (such as social networks and blogs, etc.),27 or the ability to speak at aca-
demic conferences and symposiums. Today, public diplomacy is still a ﬁeld of 
research that, in the case of France, deserves to be investigated further. Indeed, 
such research would be instrumental in producing a larger sociology on what it 
means to be a diplomat today at the Quai d’Orsay.28 
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